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Abstract
Password-based authenticated group key exchange
protocols allow group users to jointly share a session
key based on a human-memorizable password. In this
paper, we present an undetectable online dictionary
attack on N-EKE-D, a recent provably secure protocol
designed to explicitly resist this type of attack. Thus,
our result contradicts the design goal. We also give
a simple attack on the key indistinguishability of
N-EKE-D and two N-EKE-M variants that exploits
the definition of partnering in their security model.
Keywords: Password-authenticated key exchange,
group, model, proof, key indistinguishability, unde-
tectable online dictionary attack, cryptanalysis.
1. Introduction
With password authenticated key exchange (PAKE)
protocols [4], [10], [11], [17], [24], parties can jointly
establish a secret key for securing the communication
between them. Such protocols take into consideration
the fact that systems often involve humans, who can-
not be expected to remember highly random-looking
secrets.
The first known PAKE secure against dictionary
attacks is the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) by
Bellovin and Merritt [4], for 2 parties. Extensions for
groups appear, e.g. in [1], [24], [6], [12].
While formally treated group key exchange pro-
tocols have more conventionally been based on a
common password shared among all group parties [6],
more recently due formal treatment has been given to
the idea of using different unique passwords between
each party and a central server [1]. In this paper, we
consider the latter setting.
The first provably secure group PAKE protocol
for n parties is due to Byun et al. [12]. However,
attacks were found on this protocol [25], and as a
consequence, this protocol was revised in [13], [14],
but further attacks were shown in [20], [18]. A variant
was given by Nam to resist his attack in [18], while
another variant was given at SPC 2006 [15] to cater
to mobile ad-hoc networks. All these protocols are
also constant-round in the sense that the number
of communication rounds is constant irrespective of
group size; they make use of broadcast channels.
Our Results. We consider the security of N-EKE-D
and N-EKE-M protocol variants of [13], [14], [18],
[15]. Although current protocols require a trusted
server S, the advantage of this setting is that it
partitions the trust of the group secret among the
group members, thus in the event of compromise e.g.
the shared password is leaked by the compromised
member, the remaining non-compromised members
can safely establish future group session keys with-
out needing any change to the members’ individual
passwords.
The existence of undetectable online dictionary at-
tacks is an issue [16], [25], [20], [21], [26] because
while it is accepted that online dictionary attacks are
inevitable for password-based protocols, the typical
mitigation (which is outside the scope of protocol
design) is to limit the number of failed login attempts.
However, this measure will only work if failed attempts
can be detected in the first place. Yet for undetectable
online dictionary attacks, incorrect password guesses
and thus failed attempts go unnoticed by the legitimate
protocol participant being attacked by the adversary.
Hence, the adversary’s active attacks via Send
queries (in the context of typical security models; see
Section II) cannot be differentiated from honest execu-
tions of a legitimate and honest protocol participant, so
security against undetectable online dictionary attacks
cannot be bound in terms of Send queries in the same
way as detectable online dictionary attacks.
N-EKE-D [15] comes with an explicit proof of
security against undetectable online dictionary attacks
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by a malicious insider. We contradict this proof by
giving such an attack. The oversight in the proof is
due to the pre-supposition of how the adversary would
behave, when it is exactly this that the definition and
use of security models aim to avoid. See [25], [19],
[20], [21], [18], [22], [23] for other examples of attacks
found on protocols at times even ones with provable
security goals.
Furthermore, we show that an inconsistency exists
between the definition of partnering in the security
model and how the group session key is generated,
and this leads to a simple but subtle attack on key
indistinguishability that fails to be captured by proofs
of the protocols. This in fact is related to showing that
the protocols do not meet the correctness requirement
[2], [5], [3] of AKE protocols, which defines that if
two instances of protocol participants are partnered and
have accepted, then both should hold the same session
key.
To the best of our knowledge, our results are the
first known analysis of the protocols in [15], [18].
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Model for Group Key Exchange
For completeness and a much clearer understanding
of our attack descriptions in later sections, we describe
here the group key exchange (GKE) security model
[7], [8], [9].
PROTOCOL PARTICIPANTS AND EXECUTION. Let U
be a non-empty set of protocol players or parties. The
adversary, A, controls the communications between all
protocol players by interacting with the set of oracles,
ΠsUi , where Π
s
U is defined to be the sth instantiation
of a player, Ui ∈ U , in a specific protocol run. The
adversary A controls the communication channels via
the queries to the targeted oracles. A description of the
oracle query types is presented as follows.
• Send(ΠsUi ,m) query. This query models ad-
versary A sending messages to instances of
players. A gets back from his query the
response which oracle ΠsUi would have gen-
erated in processing message m. If oracle
ΠsUi has not yet terminated and the execu-
tion of protocol leads to accepting, variables
SIDS are updated. A query of the form
Send(ΠsUi , “start”) initiates an execution of
this protocol.
• Reveal(ΠsUi) query. Any oracle upon receiv-
ing such a query and if it has accepted and
thus holds some session key K, sends this
back to A.
• Corrupt(U) query. This query allows the ad-
versary to learn the long-lived key of user U .
Under the strong corruption model, internal
data of any instances of U executing the
protocol are also given to A. Under the weak
corruption model, only the long-lived key is
given to the adversary.
• Test(ΠsUi) query. This query is the only ora-
cle query that does not correspond to any of
A’s abilities or any real-world event, and is
only available if ΠsUi is “fresh”. This query
allows to define the indistinguishability-based
notion of security for the key, defined by the
following game, denoted GameGKE(A,P ),
between adversary A and oracles ΠsUi in-
volved in executions of protocol P . During
the game, A can ask any of the above queries,
and may only ask the Test query once. De-
pending on a randomly chosen bit, b ∈ {0, 1},
A is given the actual session key if b = 1 or a
session key drawn randomly from the session
key distribution if b = 0. Finally, A outputs
a guess b′. Informally, A succeeds if it can
guess the bit b with non-negligible advantage
AdvGKEP,A over randomly guessing, where the
advantage is defined as
AdvGKEP,A = 2Pr[b′ = b]− 1.
Note that the first three queries: Send,Reveal,Corrupt
are common for any kind model for authenticated
key exchange protocols, to model the adversary’s
ability to attack the protocol. The final query Test is
used to define the security of the protocol for which
the adversary aims to break, in this case, that of the
indistinguishability of the session key.
2.2. N-Party EKE Protocols
Let U1, . . . , Un be the identities in lexical order of
n users. Denote by G a finite cyclic group of order
q ∈ Z∗p, where p and q are two primes such that p =
2q + 1, and p a safe prime such that the Decisional
Diffie Hellman (DDH) is hard in G. Let g denote a
generator of G of order q, and || denotes concatenation.
All arithmetic operations in this paper are performed
under the group G.
The n-party EKE-D protocol due to Byun et al.
in [15] involves n group members and 1 server, and
is specially designed to suit particularly multicast
networks. Recall that multicast networks allow for
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communication between a single sender and multiple
receivers. For multicast networks, all messages from
individual single senders can be sent in parallel during
a single round to all receivers, thus more round-
efficient group-based protocols can be designed in such
networks. Denote Hi, for i = {1, 2, 3} as an ideal
hash function, H a collision resistant hash function,
and Epw(·) the encryption under secret password pw.
EKE-D consists of two rounds. Round 1 is a simul-
taneous run of a 2-party PAKE between each group
member Ui with the server S to set up a secure channel
(in the confidentiality sense) between them. In Round
2, the server distributes a common keying message to
all clients via the secure channel. This will be used
to form the common secret session key sk among all
group members. See Fig. 1.
In fact, N-EKE-D is one of the latest variants that
builds on the N-EKE-M protocol originally proposed
in [12]. Due to attacks in [25], the designers revised
the protocol in [13], [14], which we denote as N-EKE-
M+. This is shown in Fig. 2. Subsequently an attack
appeared in [18] where another variant was further
proposed, for which we denote as N-EKE-M++.
3. Cryptanalysis of N-EKE Protocols
In this section we will consider the security of the
latest three variants of the N-EKE protocol initiated by
the work of Byun et al. [12]. These variants are namely
the N-EKE-D [15], N-EKE-M+ [14] and N-EKE-M++
[18].
3.1. Attack on N-EKE-D
We describe an undetectable online dictionary attack
by a malicious insider which applies to N-EKE-D [15],
a variant of the N-EKE-M designed for multi-layer
ad-hoc networks. This attack directly contradicts the
security of N-EKE-D since N-EKE-D was explicitly
proven to be secure against this type of attack.
1) The malicious insider adversary Ui initiates a
protocol session where only S is activated, while
other group members Uj (j 6= i) can be absent.
2) In Round 1, Ui computes y′j = Epw′j (gxj ) for
j = 1 . . . n, j 6= i where pw′j is its guess of the
password shared between Uj and S and xj is
any value. It also computes its own contribution
y′i = Epwi(g
xi) as normal. It sends y′j (for j =
1 . . . n) to S.
3) When S broadcasts tj = Epwj (gsj ) (for j =
1 . . . n), these are eavesdropped by Ui.
4) In Round 2, S broadcasts skj ⊕ N (for j =
1 . . . n) which are eavesdropped by Ui. Since Ui
can compute N = (ski ⊕ N)⊕ ski, it can thus
compute skj = (skj ⊕N)⊕N (for j = 1 . . . n).
This means it can compute H2(skj ||Uj) (for j =
1 . . . n) to be sent to S for correct verification.
5) Ui then computes sk′j = H1(sid||(E−1pw′
j
(tj))
xj )
and checks if H(sk′j) = skj . If not, it repeats
from step (1.) with a different password guess
pw′j .
Note that this attack allows the adversary Ui to try
passwords pwj of all Uj (for j = 1 . . . n, j 6= i) in
parallel, thus Ui can verify n− 1 password guesses in
each session rather than just one.
It is intriguing to note that the N-EKE-D has an
explicit theorem proving that it is secure against un-
detectable online dictionary attacks by a malicious
insider. The flaw in the proof is that the designers pre-
supposed on the behaviour of the adversary, and in
doing so, overlooked the fact that an insider adversary
can obtain N and thus any skj (j = 1 . . . n) which can
be used to verify the adversary’s password guess as in
step 5 of the above attack. Similarly, the proof also
overlooked the fact that since the adversary can obtain
N and thus any skj (j = 1 . . . n), the authenticator
H2(skj ||Uj) can be forged easily even if H2 is an
ideal hash function.
Proving the security of a protocol within a security
model by assuming only on what resources an adver-
sary can access to, has the advantage that it captures
all types of attacks that an adversary can mount given
those resources. However, if the proof pre-supposes
that the adversary attacks in a particular way, then
there is a risk, as shown above, that the proof will fail
to capture other attacks where the adversary behaves
differently. Thus in this case the advantage of proving
security within a generic model is lost.
3.2. Key (In)Distinguishability of N-EKE-D,
N-EKE-M+, and N-EKE-M++
Here we describe a simple attack on the N-EKE-D
protocol [15] and all N-EKE-M protocols [14], [18]
except the original [12]. It exploits the definition of
partnering in the N-EKE-M and N-EKE-D security
model in [12], and breaks the key indistinguishability
[15] of the protocols.
We restate the definition here for completeness.
Partnering [12]. Let the session identifier sid of
a participant instance be the concatenation of all
the messages between S and all group members Uj
(j = 1 . . . n). Any pair of instances Ui and Uk of S
and Uj (j = 1 . . . n) are said to be partnered if and
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S U1 · · · Un
Round 1: si ∈$ Z∗q x1 ∈$ Z∗q · · · xn ∈$ Z∗q
Broadcast: Broadcast: Broadcast:
Epwi(g
si) Epw1(g
x1) · · · Epwn−1(g
xn)
Round 2: ski = H1(sid||gxisi) sk1 =
H1(sid||gx1s1)
· · · skn = H1(sid||gxnsn)
ski = H(ski) sk1 = H(sk1) . . . skn = H(skn)
Listsc = {sk1, sk2, . . . , skn}
N ∈$ Z
∗
q
Broadcast: Broadcast: Broadcast:
N ⊕ ski,
H2(ski||S), H2(sk1||U1) · · · H2(skn||Un)
Key Check: Check: Check:
Computation: H2(ski||Ui) H2(sk1||S) · · · H2(skn||S)
Everyone computes:
sk = H3(sids||N)
where sids = sid′||sk1 ⊕N‖ . . . ‖skn ⊕N
and sid′ = Epw1(gx1)|| . . . ||Epwn(gxn)
Figure 1. N-EKE-D [15]
only if sidi=sidk and they compute the same session
key.
With this definition, sid then includes all broadcast
messages sent and received by S and Uj (j = 1 . . . n),
including the authenticator messages H2(·).
We describe the attack as applied to N-EKE-M+ in
[14]. It is straightforward to see that it also works on
other variants in [15], [18].
1) Adversary A initiates a protocol session.
2) In Round 2, A issues a Send query to cause Ui
to receive some chosen x instead of H2(skj ||S).
Note that Ui does not use this message in any
of its computations, since this broadcast authen-
ticator is actually for S to verify but Ui receives
it anyway due to the broadcast channel; so the
rest of the protocol proceeds normally.
3) A issues a Reveal query to Ui and obtains the
session key sk.
4) A issues a Test query to Uj (j 6= i) and obtains
the test session key sk∗.
5) A checks if sk∗ = sk and outputs b = 1 if this
is true; otherwise it outputs b = 0.
Issuing a Reveal query to Ui does not affect the
freshness of the instance of Uj (j 6= i) since by
the definition of partnership restated above, Ui will
have an sidi that differs from Uj’s sidj thus they
will not be partnered. This makes it valid to issue a
Test query to Uj . Furthermore, since the computation
of the session key sk does not involve the changed
authenticator message H2(skj ||S), then clearly Ui and
Uj will compute the same sk.
This result breaks the key indistinguishability secu-
rity of the N-EKE-D, N-EKE-M+ and N-EKE-M++
protocols.
The oversight in the design that led to this attack is
because in extending the original N-EKE-M protocol
of [12] to newer variants in [14], [15], [18], the
computation of the session key sk was not redefined
to include the authenticator messages. To be precise,
if the session key computation is a function of all
broadcast messages to be consistent with the partnering
definition, this attack can be captured in the key
indistinguishability proof in [15].
This fact can also be seen from the view of cor-
rectness, which is defined such that if instances are
partnered and have accepted (with a session key), then
they should hold the same session key. Hence, if they
are not partnered, they should therefore not hold the
same key. But this latter case was shown in the context
of the above attack.
4. Conclusion
We have treated group key exchange protocols in
the setting where users each shares a different pass-
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S U1 · · · Un
Round 1: si ∈$ Z∗q x1 ∈$ Z∗q · · · xn ∈$ Z∗q
Broadcast: Broadcast: Broadcast:
Epwi(g
si) Epw1(g
x1) · · · Epwn−1(g
xn)
Round 2: ski = H1(sid||gxisi) sk1 =
H1(sid||gx1s1)
· · · skn = H1(sid||gxnsn)
N ∈$ Z
∗
q
Broadcast: Broadcast: Broadcast:
N ⊕ ski,
H2(ski||S), H2(sk1||U1) · · · H2(skn||Un)
Key Check: Check: Check:
Computation: H2(ski||Ui) H2(sk1||S) · · · H2(skn||S)
Everyone computes:
sk = H3(sids||N)
where sids = sid′||sk1 ⊕N‖ . . . ‖skn ⊕N
and sid′ = Epw1(gx1)|| . . . ||Epwn(gxn)
Figure 2. N-EKE-M+ [14]
word with the server. Notably, we have shown an
undetectable online dictionary attack against N-EKE-
D which directly contradicts its security proof in its
Theorem 3.4 [15].
We also showed that due to correctness issues caused
by inconsistencies exist between the definition of part-
nering in security models of protocols in [13], [14],
[18], [15] and the group session key computation or
verification computations.
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